



Changes in Israeli collective identity as a source of tension in the 
political arena
Abstract: The positions of the political parties in Israel on the central issues that concern the Israeli 
society reveal a struggle between two social orientations regarding the desired character of the State of 
Israel. At one extreme stands the Jewish ethnic identity that draws its origins from the Jewish tradition 
and aspires to guaranty the Jewish nature of the state. The civic liberal identity that stands at the other 




took power and since then have operated to promote the Jewish ethnic identity. The strengthening of 
right-wing parties reveals a fundamental change in Israeli society.




and the EU widening.
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Union Commission made decision 7834/F1 to obligate Israel to label products produced 
in the areas of Judea, Samaria, and the Golan Heights, territories conquered in 1967 and 
still held by Israel.1 The Commission explained its decision as the desire to avoid the 





the European Union of hypocrisy and double standards and warned against actions that 
1  European commission, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=list&coteId=3&year= 
2015&number=7834&language=EN, 12.01.2016.
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supported terrorism. Netanyahu even compared the requirement to label the products to 
periods of the past in Europe when Jews were required to label themselves.2 The govern-
ment of Israel released an official condemnation and decided to suspend dialogue with 
the European Union in certain areas, and the Minister of Justice announced that it would 
adopt legal steps against the decision to label the products. Another step that might il-
lustrate the extent of the anger of the Israeli response was the summoning of the EU’s 
ambassador to Israel, Faaborg-Andersen, for a reprimand from the Minster of Foreign 
Affairs. It seems that the reciprocal announcements and the strident tone taken by both 
sides indicate a new chapter in the system of relations between Israel and the countries of 
the European Union. More than anything, this dispute reveals the gaps in the understand-
ing of reality and in the reading of the international political map.
This paper argues that understanding the response of the Israeli government and the 
assessment of the nature of the relations expected in the future with the countries of the 
European Union  requires  looking  inwards,  into  Israeli  society  and  into  the processes 
that are taking place in it as the source of the official policy of the government. In every 
society there are circles of conflicting collective identities, which compete over the right 
to represent the entire collective. The dominant identity generally controls the centers 
of political power and grants  legitimacy  to act  to  the government  (Ben-Rafael, 2000, 
p. 491). Therefore,  the government of  Israel does not act  in a void, and  its  responses 
reflect a public mood and collective identity that steadily is becoming established in the 
political centers of power of Israel.
The Israeli political system
The  roots  of  the  Israeli  political  system,  like  the  rest  of  the  social  arrangements, 
can be found in the institutions and procedures that existed in the Zionist movement 
many years before the establishment of the state. The Zionist movement sought to adopt 






prominent characteristics of the Israeli political system. The temporary state council that 
operated before the establishment of the state chose to continue the proportional method 
in  the  elections  for  the Knesset,  the  Israeli  parliament. The  assumption was  that  the 
method would become an inseparable part of the political tradition of the Jewish com-
munity and was intended to collect the different sectors and to prevent the departure of 
marginal groups in Jewish society that might have felt harmed by the new political order 
(Horowitz, Lissak, 1977, p. 305).
Israeli society is a young and diverse society. It is composed of many groups that dif-
fer in origin, culture and in the vision they have for the State of Israel. The combination 
2  Israeli  Prime  Minister’s  Office,  http://www.pmo.gov.il/mediacenter/spokesman/pages/spoke-
start221115.aspx, 12/01/2016.
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of a heterogeneous Israeli society and proportional representation has created a highly 
divided political system which expresses the social mosaic. The number of parties that 
have been represented in the Knesset during the 68 years of the existence of the State 
of Israel ranged from a minimum of ten to a maximum of fifteen under every system of 
elections. It appears that political divisions have become so intrinsic that even attempts 
to raise the threshold percentage over the years did not succeed in halting this phenom-
enon. One of the ways of analyzing the Israeli political system, and from that to under-
stand the social tensions, is through mapping the parties according to the main issues that 
are at the core of society. Israeli society is a young society which has not yet succeeded 
in establishing for itself an agreed collective identity. Existential topics that pertain to 
shaping the life of the collective remain disputed by the different groups. Of the many 
schisms that divide society, it is possible to note two that are considered most central: the 
religious schism and the ideological schism (Arian, Shamir, 2001, p. 21).
The religious schism exposes the division in Jewish society regarding the degree 
of desired involvement of religion in the life of the state. At the right extreme there are 
the religious ultra-orthodox (Haredi) parties, Yahadut HaTorah (United Torah Judaism) 
and Shas, which aspire to apply the laws of Jewish Halacha (traditional Jewish religious 
law) to the state. The current character of the state causes them to present an instrumental 
approach, in a way that does not obligate them to recognize the institutions of the state 
and its secular laws. The HaBayit HaYehudi Party presents a more restrained religious 
position. As a Zionist religious party, it aspires to shape the state according to Halacha 
and to instill the values of Judaism into the public, but also identifies with the state and 
participates actively in all its institutions. At the left extreme there are the secular parties 
such as Meretz and Yesh Atid, which call for disestablishing the relationship between re-
ligion and the institutions of the state, and for the end of religious coercion. A pragmatic 
outlook is presented by the large parties that are situated between the two poles. The 
HaAvoda (Labor) party calls for dialogue and compromise with the religious, and Likud 
adopts religious positions from a national connection. Figure 1 presents the sequence of 
the Israeli parties along the religious schism, with the secular parties at the left end, the 
religious parties’ position on the right.
Figure 1. Parties sequence according to religious schism 2015
Separation between

















by Israeli society. Its considerable centrality caused the political system in Israel to be 
arranged according to the parties’ position on this topic, and the composition of coali-
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tions versus oppositions since the establishment of the state was dictated according 




hawkish position presents a perception according  to which  the conflict between  the 
State of Israel and the Arabs  is unsolvable, or at  least unsolvable  in  the foreseeable 
future. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a policy of forceful deterrence. The right ne-
gates any territorial surrender as a basis of peace agreements with the Arab states and 
supports the Jewish settlement enterprise in the territories of Judea and Samaria. As we 
move leftwards, towards the dovish position, the perception that it is possible to reach 
a peace agreement with the Arab countries and with the Palestinians strengthens, and 
the willingness increases to negotiate over the future of the conquered territories and 
to withdraw from them in return for an agreement. At the right extreme there are the 
parties that support the idea of a Greater Israel. The position of the religious parties is 
derived from the belief in the religious right to the Land of Israel. At the left extreme 
there are the parties of the Arab List and Meretz, which call for the return of all the 
conquered territories and to retreat to the boundaries of the ‘Green Line’ from before 
the 1967 war. The Likud and Labor parties are situated in the center, where the Labor 
party  tends  to  the  left  and displays  a willingness  for  territorial  compromises, while 
Likud presents more a pragmatic position and is based on security considerations. 
Figure 2 presents a left-right continuum of the Israeli political system with the dovish 
parties at the left end, the hawkish parties on the right.
















ideological  issue  on  the  political  agenda  in  Israel  (Goldberg,  1992,  p.  60). The  con-
nection to Jerusalem and to the historical parts of the homeland created considerable 
excitement in the Jewish population. Religious emotions began to flood society when a 
religious interpretation was given to the issue of the return to the holy places. The result 
was that positions towards the issue of the territories began to overlap with the positions 
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been conquered to be a means for the resolution of the conflict with the Arabs, moved 
leftwards and adopted dovish positions.
Figure 3 presents the map of the parties today according to their position regarding 





the national  religious party, presents  rigid attitudes  regarding  the Arab-Israeli conflict 







Parties in the coalition
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and religious perceptions regarding the characteristics of the desired society. This bloc of 
parties forms the coalition, and the ministers of the government of Israel, including those 
who responded sharply towards the European Union, come from it.








1. The ideological dimension. The way in which the collective wants to see itself. In 
other words, the conscious identity that includes perceptions, the world of values and 
cultural standards that society attributes to itself and aspires to fulfill.




The mapping of the parties relative to their positions in the topics of security and 
religion reveals two contradictory social orientations which struggle for the identity of 
the State of Israel. Each one pushes the desired boundaries of society inwards among the 
citizens of the state and outwards towards other countries, and presents a different world 
of values relative to the desired identity of Israeli society. The organization of the map 
of the parties, as can be seen in Figure 3, is not only an ideological continuum but also 
primarily a reflection of the two collective identities that cut across Israeli society and 







The outside border also  includes  the Jews who are  found  in  the Diaspora, but  the 
hostility that is attributed to the rest of the world leads to the presentation of rigid 
attitudes towards the Arab side and towards the diplomatic arena. Since the Jewish 
religion and tradition serve as a source of the structuring of the collective identity, the 





is determined according  to a  system of obligations and civic  rights,  and  therefore 
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status to the civic political institutions which serve as mechanisms of supervision and 









grinder  to make  them into one nation  in  the  format of  the civic-secular  identity. This 












which was different from the identity they were required to adopt. The modern identity 
of  the secular and socialist Jew did not suit  the ‘Mizrachi’ (Eastern) Jews, who came 
from countries where the secular revolution had not occurred and where there had not 
been a  liberal movement  that challenged  traditional  society  (Eisenstadt, 2004, p. 38). 
These communities saw the establishment of the State of Israel to be the realization of 
the  religious vision and  refused  to  surrender ethnic  symbols, particularly  in  the State 
of  the  Jews. The  ‘melting pot’ policy  that  the Labor Party had instituted to erase the 
identities of the Diaspora and to adopt the new Zionist identity created cultural distress 
and considerable frustration among the ‘Mizrachi’ Jews, who saw the Likud Party to be 
a more appropriate political home.
This trend was intensified following the dramatic events that occurred in the decade 
before the political upheaval. First, the conquest of Jerusalem and the territories of Judea 
and Samaria  in  1967  only  strengthened  the  religious  understanding  of  the Messianic 
vision  and Divine  intervention,  especially  in  light  of  the  inability  of  the  civic-liberal 
camp to explain or to justify the control over these territories. There was a reason why 
it was the religious Zionists who acted to establish the Jewish settlement enterprise in 
the  territories of  Judea, Samaria,  and Gaza which were conquered  in  the war. As  the 






identity. The appearance of the security issue in the form of the control of the territories 




feelings from the past of existential threat to the Jewish people. The responsibility for 
the outcome of the war was assigned to the Labor Party, which appeared to have lost the 
public’s trust in its ability to provide a suitable answer to the problems of Jewish soci-
ety and the State of Israel (Grinberg, 2001, p. 659), the first of which is the existential 
problem of the Jewish people. In this manner, the civic-liberal identity slowly became 








nant collective identity in Israeli society changes.
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Reinforcement of the argument that the voting for the Knesset is linked to the voter’s 

























capable of belonging to the other social identity.
Future trends







Character of the state: 37% noted that the Jewish character of the state is more 
important  to  them, while 35% noted  that  the democratic  character  is more  important 
to them.
Arab Citizens: 67% noted the national tension between Jews and Arabs as the main 
social issue of Israeli society. Nearly 42% agree that most of the Arab public has not 
accepted the existence of the state and supports the elimination of Israel. 57% of the 
Jewish public agrees that the state must direct more budgets to Jewish communities than 
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to the Arab communities, and 56% agree that the human rights organizations cause harm 
to the country.
Most of  Jewish society, according  to  these findings,  supports  the  rightwing camp. 
The Jewish identity of the state is important to it no less than the democratic identity, 






joined by a number of reasons:
1.  The demographic factor. From a demographic perspective, the Jewish-ethnic camp 





ditional and religious camp derives from the high natural increase that characterizes 
the religious public as opposed to the secular public.
2. The dimension of time. The young generation born into the reality of the Israeli con-
trol and Jewish settlement in the territories of Judea and Samaria does not differenti-
ate between the concepts of the Land of Israel and the State of Israel, and sees these 
territories as a legitimate and inseparable part of the territory of the State. It is not 
surprising that every attempt to dispute Israeli legitimacy in the territories of Judea 
and Samaria on the part of the diplomatic system is interpreted as an attempt to harm 




the validity of the model of civic identity. The violence perpetrated by Arabs against 
the Jewish public contributes to the delineation of the social borders between Jewish 
citizens and Arab citizens and gives legitimacy to the negation of civic equality.
The electoral significance of these findings is that the bloc of right parties and reli-















foreign policy of the Israeli government and its responses should be done through the 
framework of the dominant social identity. The decision of the European Union Com-





countries of the European Union will increase. Any diplomatic initiative on the part of 
the European countries will be rejected, and the forceful tone on the part of the State of 
Israel towards international criticism will continue.
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dychotomicznego  obrazu  świata  i  zajęciu  bezkompromisowego  stanowiska wobec  różnych  kwestii 
w Izraelu jak i w stosunkach międzynarodowych, włączając w to Unię Europejską.
Obecna struktura społeczeństwa izraelskiego wskazuje, że tendencja do utrzymania tożsamości ży-
dowsko-etnicznej mocni się w najbliższych latach, pogłębiając rozdźwięki pomiędzy Izraelem a Unią 
Europejską.
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nia wyborcze
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